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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of agrarian tenancy contract choice and its implication on 
productivity in prewar Japan. Rapid agricultural growth under extensive tenancy relationships in 
prewar Japan was achieved with the prevalence of a unique rent reduction contract, which was more 
efficient than a share tenancy or a pure fixed-rent contract in terms of provision of incentives and 
risk-sharing. Despite its potential efficiency, a rent reduction contract incurred substantial transaction 
costs, which may have inhibited its adoption outside Japan. The prevalence of this contract in prewar 
Japan was likely due to the presence of villages that reduced such costs through informal governance 
of the private tenancy relationships. 
We found quantitatively at the village level that the choice of tenancy contract in prewar Iwate 
prefecture was affected by risk and possibly transaction costs. Furthermore, a sign of Marshallian 
inefficiency was found at the prefecture level, where the prevalence of tenancy and productivity is 
negatively correlated and such inefficiency was worse in prefectures with a greater proportion of 
share tenancy. 
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural development supports industrialization and economic growth by providing food 
and a labor force to the industrial sector. To play these roles, the agricultural sector must increase or 
at least sustain productivity without falling into the Malthusian trap. Indeed, most developed 
countries experienced agricultural development with productivity growth during economic 
development (Hayami and Ruttan 1973). With respect to Japan, Hayami (1973) and Hayami and 
Yamada (1991) made clear the high growth of agricultural production and productivity in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nakamura (1971) characterized this pattern of agricultural 
growth combined with rapid growth of the industrial sector before the World War I as “balanced 
growth.”  
Japanese agricultural development is particular in that the production and productivity growth 
since the late nineteenth century was accompanied by the development of extensive land tenancy 
relations. As we see in the next section, nearly half of the arable land was tenanted and 70% of the 
farm households leased-in land. It is notable that rapid production and productivity growth occurred 
under the expansion of tenancy relations, because depending upon the contractual form adopted, 
tenancy can potentially undermine productivity by hurting the incentives of the tenants. In particular, 
the disincentive of a share tenancy---the Marshallian inefficiency---has been widely acknowledged. 
A distinguishing feature of the Japanese tenancy is the prevalence of a unique contractual form, the 
rent reduction contract, which is a fixed-rent contract with state-contingent rent reduction when crop 
failure occurs. A rent reduction contract is more efficient than a share tenancy or a pure fixed-rent 
contract when risk is low, because it provides decent incentives (because it is basically a fixed-rent 
contract) and reduces the risk borne by the tenant (because it reduces rent in bad years) at the same 
time (Arimoto 2005). Therefore, the prevalence of this contractual form could have mitigated the 
problem of incentives and sustained productivity growth even under extensive tenancy relations. 
The prevalence of this efficient rent reduction contract in Japan raises the question of contract 
choice: if it is more efficient than a share tenancy or a pure fixed-rent contract, why is it uncommon 
in other countries? Economic historians and development economists have so far asked why a share 
tenancy, which appears to be less efficient than a fixed-rent contract in terms of provision of 
incentives, prevailed in some regions in some time periods. For example, the prevalence of share 
tenancy contracts in pre-modern France and Italy has attracted the attention of economic historians 
(Hoffman 1982, 1984; Ackerberg and Botticini 2000, 2002). The standard argument resolves the   3
puzzle by noting the benefit of risk-sharing held by a share tenancy (e.g., Stiglitz 1974 and 
Holmstrom 1987. For a survey of the literature, see Singh 1989, Otsuka et al 1992, Huffman and Just 
2004, and Otsuka 2007). However, they assume linear contracts and therefore rule out the possibility 
of adopting alternative nonlinear contracts, such as a rent reduction contract. Instead of asking why a 
seemingly inefficient share tenancy arrangement prevailed in some time and places, we reverse the 
question: Why is a seemingly efficient rent reduction contract uncommon in most countries and why 
did it prevail in prewar Japan? What are the implications of the prevalence of rent reduction 
contracts on productivity and agricultural development in Japan?   
To answer the first question, this paper focuses on transaction costs following the argument by 
Ohno (1989) that implementing a rent reduction generates prohibitively high transaction costs, so 
that such contracts have rarely been observed outside Japan. Various historical documents show that 
the transaction costs incurred in a rent reduction contract included inspecting yield and negotiating 
on whether rent should be reduced and, if so, at what rate. These costs could discourage the adoption 
of the rent reduction contract despite its potential efficiency in terms of incentives and risk-sharing. 
However, in prewar Japan, local communities played a role in reducing such transaction costs 
through governing and institutionalizing the process of rent reduction. We then investigate the 
correlation between the potential determinants of contract choice and adoption of share tenancy 
using village-level data on the tenancy contract distribution in Iwate prefecture. We found that share 
tenancies prevailed in villages with higher risk and severe crop failures, consistent with the standard 
risk-sharing thesis. It also appeared that rent reduction contracts were more likely to be adopted in 
villages with stronger communal ties. Together with the qualitative historical evidences, it is likely 
that transaction costs and the presence of community that reduces such costs was critical in the 
adoption of rent reduction contracts in Japan.   
To answer the second question concerning productivity, we conducted fixed-effect estimations 
using prefecture-level panel data to investigate whether rice yield was lower in prefectures where 
more paddies were cultivated under tenancy. We found a negative correlation between the prevalence 
of tenancy and rice yield and that such inefficiency was worse in prefectures with a higher 
proportion of share tenancy. Therefore, the Marshallian inefficiency seems to be present in prewar 
Japan at the prefecture level but it was less severe where rent reduction contracts were dominant. 
Combining these two results suggests that the prevalence of rent reduction contracts was sustained   4
by the informal community institutions and that this helped prevent a serious decline in agricultural 
productivity, which is a premise of industrialization and economic development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the 
agricultural sector and tenancy relationships in prewar Japan. Section 3 summarizes the framework 
for tenancy contract choice and presents the results of quantitative investigation of contract choice 
using village-level data from Iwate prefecture. In Section 4, we provide the results of 
prefecture-level fixed-effect estimation on the correlation between contract choice and productivity. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendix presents alternative estimation results of contract 
choice on productivity using village-level data. 
 
2.  Agriculture and land tenancy in prewar Japan
1 
 
2.1.  Agricultural production and growth 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, agricultural production grew fairly rapidly 
in Japan (Table 1). The annual growth rates of agricultural output were 1.6% and 2.0% in 1880-1900 
and 1900-1920, respectively. They are lower than the growth rates of the production of the mining 
and manufacturing in the same periods, but much higher than those of the agriculture in the U.S. 
Agricultural growth in Japan slowed down in the 1920s but the growth rate was still positive. 
 
[Table 1: Growth of agricultural production and productivity] 
 
According to the decomposition of the growth of agricultural output into those of inputs and 
productivity by Hayami (1973) (Table 1), the production growth is mostly accounted for by the 
growth of labor productivity. Indeed, the labor input measured by the number of agricultural workers 
gradually declined in this period reflecting the fact that the agricultural sector supplied labor force to 
the industrial sector. To put it differently, the labor productivity growth enabled the agricultural 
sector to increase production while simultaneously functioning as a labor pool for the industrial 
sector. Meanwhile, the labor productivity growth is mainly accounted for by the growth of TFP. The 
basic cause for the especially high TFP growth before World War I was the creation and 
dissemination of a newly coordinated agricultural technology, which is called the “Meiji Agricultural 
                                                        
1  For background of Japanese agricultural history written in English, see Dore (1959), Hayami and 
Yamada (1991), Francks (2006), Kawagoe (1999), and Waswo (1977).   5
Method.” This Method was composed of several complementary technologies, such as intensive use 
of fertilizer, introduction of new rice varieties with higher response to fertilizer, use of animal power 
for cultivation, and conversion to dry paddy fields. The Method systematized these technologies, 
which had been developed since the late Tokugawa Era (Yagi 1990).   
 
2.2.  Development of land tenancy 
Land tenancy was pervasive in the prewar Japanese agriculture. There were more than five 
million farm households and this number remained essentially unchanged throughout the prewar 
period. They were mainly small farms; the average arable land size per farm household was close to 
1 ha. At the same time, a large proportion of those farms were tenanted land. Table 2 displays the 
number and distribution of tenancy in terms of number of farm households and area of arable land. 
Nearly 70% of the farm households cultivated some plots under tenancy, either as owner-cum 
tenants or pure tenants. In terms of area of arable land, the proportion of tenanted land was around 
45% from the early twentieth century to 1940. 
 
[Table 2: Extent of tenancy relations] 
 
The historical origin of the prewar Japanese land tenancy occurred during the Tokugawa Era 
when land tenancy was already de facto prevalent through transfer of land by mortgage or pledge in 
credit transactions. It was the 1873 Land Tax Reform Act and the 1873 Land Collateral Rule that 
provided the modern legal foundation by conferring the right to own and sell property. By the land 
tax reform, the Meiji Government recognized the ownership of the de facto landlords in the 
Tokugawa Era, which implied that the tenancy relationship was recognized as well. The government 
issued the land certificates (chiken) to the recognized owners, and they were then able to sell their 
land by selling the certificates. At the same time, the government determined the official land price 
of each plot basically according to its fertility and imposed the land tax amounting 3% of the land 
price. The land tax was collected in cash. Rents from tenants, on the other hand, were usually paid in 
kind, which implies that the landlords sold crops to obtain cash to pay the land tax. 
Land tenancy expanded after the land tax reform until the early twentieth century. The 
estimated proportion of arable land under tenancy just after the land tax reform was 27.4%, 
excluding Hokkaido, which became 35.9% in 1883-1884 and 43.2% in 1903, when the proportion   6
including Hokkaido was 43.6% (Furushima ed. 1958; Miwa and Hara eds. 2007, p.19). The trigger 
of this expansion was the severe deflation of the early 1880s caused by the tightening 
macro-economic policy led by the Financial Minister, Masayoshi Matsukata. The rice price sharply 
declined under the deflation, while the land tax based on the official land price was fixed. Due to the 
substantial increase of real burden of the land tax, many landed farmers were obliged to sell their 
lands and become tenants. It is notable that this was the period when the agricultural production and 
productivity rapidly grew, as described above. In other words, the early phase of agricultural growth 
was accompanied by the expansion of tenancy relations.   
One of the characteristics of the tenancy system in prewar Japan was that the landlords were 
usually small and not so different from the tenant. Table 3 shows the distribution of farm households 
by the size class of land owned. More than 70% of the farm households owned less than 1 ha and 
only 4% owned large holdings of more than 5 ha.   
 
[Table 3: Distribution of household by size of land ownership] 
 
2.3. Tenancy  contracts 
Tenancy agreements were verbal and contracts were rarely written down. According to the 
Taisho 10 Survey of Tenancy Customs (MAF, 1926), the most comprehensive survey of farm tenancy 
customs in prewar Japan conducted in 1921, more than 70% of the farm tenancy was arranged 
verbally. Similarly, only 80 out of 439 landlords (18%) studied in The Survey on the Custom of 
Tenancy Rent Reduction and Exemption (Teikoku Nokai, 1927), who were sampled from each 
county across Japan, had written down the contract. Even a written contract seemed to lack legal 
formality and binding force; the Survey reports that “The contents of these contracts are incomplete 
from the viewpoint of the concept of a lease contract (p. 34).” 
Most tenancy arrangements had no explicit contract duration. An arrangement was expected to 
last until either the landlord or the tenant asked for cancellation. For those that had a specific 
contract term, the duration was usually 3 to 5 years or longer for paddies and farms, and 5 to 
10  years for fruit orchards, mulberry farms, and tea fields
2. Sakane (1999) indicated that the 
                                                        
2  Bandiera (2007) studies tenancy contract duration in Italy, 1870-1880, and finds that the choice of 
contract length was driven by the need to provide incentives for non-observable investment, taking 
into account transaction costs and imperfections in the credit markets that made incentive provision 
costly. The fact that the contract durations were longer for fruits and mulberries relative to annual 
crops in prewar Japan seems to be consistent with this argument.   7
Japanese landlord-tenant relationships were usually stable and the contract durations relatively long, 
which was supported by regional mutual trust among villagers. 
Unlike in most Asian countries where the average proportion of share tenancies in tenanted land 
exceeded 50% in 1990 (Otsuka 2007), the predominant form of paddy tenancy in prewar Japan was 
a fixed-rent tenancy-in-kind paid after the harvest. Share tenancy was rarely observed in shadowy 
fields in the mountainous areas, paddy fields with cold water, mountainous farms, newly cultivated 
areas or poor fields where the yield is unstable due to flood or drought (MAF, 1934, p. 341), 
covering only 1.6% and 2.1% of the area of paddy and field under tenancy in 1941 (Table 4). At the 
prefectural level, Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Nagano, Gifu, and Okinawa prefecture had more than 5% of 
their tenanted paddy under share tenancy, where the coefficients of variation of rice productivity for 
1931-40 are relatively high. 
 
[Table 4: Rice productivity and areas of share tenancy by prefecture (1941)] 
 
The unique characteristic of the Japanese fixed-rent contract is that landlords were expected to 
reduce the rent temporarily in times of crop failure
3. Of the 449 landlords studied in the above 
mentioned Survey, 445 reduced the rent in case of inevitable crop failure, and 2 out of the remaining 
5 had adopted a share tenancy. The majority of landlords (279 out of 439, or 64%) had explicit 
reduction schedules. The actual rent,  r , to be paid under a fixed-rent contract with rent reduction 
can be written as: 






y y if y R






where  R  is the predetermined fixed base rent,  y  is output and  y ˆ  is the cut-off value of 
output---usually 70%--80% of average output over recent years---used as the criteria for “crop 
failure”. The function  () ⋅ φ  specifies the amount of the reduction. For example,  () y y y − = ˆ φ  
implies that the rent reduction is proportional to the decline of output. We shall henceforth refer to 
this contract as a rent reduction contract. The ex post adjustment of rents only took place in bad 
crops, and there were generally no increase of rent in good years. Thus, ex-post state-contingent rent 
adjustment was upwardly rigid. Moreover, since it was uncommon to raise the fixed-rent except after 
the landlord invested in land improvement or irrigation, the tenant came to have more crops to their 
                                                        
3  See Waswo (1977), ch. 2 for an English description of rent reduction and landlord--tenancy 
relations in prewar Japan.   8
hand as land productivity rose, leading into changing output distribution between a landlord and a 
tenant (Figure 1).  
 
[Figure 1: Distribution of output in tenancy relations] 
 
Since formal tenancy contracts were rarely written down, reduction of rent was determined by 
negotiations between landlords and tenants. Typically, rent reduction was initiated by a request from 
the tenant. The landlord and the tenants then conducted an yield sampling, known as kemi or 
tsubogari (literally meaning to harvest a plot of one tsubo, approximately 3.3 m
2) by harvesting the 
output on a unit sample plot within a paddy. They then used the result of sampling to estimate the 
total output. In many cases, rent reduction was granted only when there was at least a certain amount 
(20%-30%) of damage to the crops. 
There are at least three rationales behind rent reduction: limited liability, de facto fixed-wage 
contracts, and risk-sharing. Because most rents in prewar Japan had to be paid in kind, the upper 
bound of rent cannot exceed the output. Rent reduction can be interpreted as a custom of meeting 
this ex post restriction of limited liability (see Shetty (1988), Basu (1992), and Ray and Singh (2001) 
for a discussion of the relationship between rent reduction, share tenancy, and limited liability). On 
the other hand, Japanese historians conventionally interpret rent reduction as a device for exploiting 
the surplus from tenants. In some cases, the fixed base rent was set at such a high level that it was 
almost impossible for tenants to pay. Under these circumstances, the landlord grants a rent reduction 
to secure the tenant's fixed subsistence output and extracts the remainder. Thus in this case, it is 
essentially a fixed-wage contract. Finally, rent reduction can be considered as a device to reduce the 
tenant’s burden of risk, which we will discuss in detail below. 
Input-sharing, often observed in South and Southeast Asia, was uncommon. Landlords rarely 
provided inputs or services other than the land and land tax, both under a share tenancy or a rent 
reduction contract. In some cases, the tenants who cultivated the plot under a share tenancy had to 
provide labor for harvesting and for carrying the rent to the landlord's house. Moreover, in some 
parts of Iwate prefecture where the patron-client Nago relationships remained, tenants had to work 
for the landlord for several days per year for either a reduced wage or none. 
 
   9
3.  Choice and distribution of tenancy contracts 
3.1.  Incentives and risk-sharing 
As the standard argument on tenancy contracts address, landlords who adopted a share tenancy 
in prewar Japan did seem to suffer from the tenant’s moral hazard. A report commissioned by the 
Teikoku Nokai (Imperial Agricultural Association) found that share tenancy reduced the tenant's 
incentives and lowered their effort. The following statement conveys Marshallian inefficiency: 
“Under a share tenancy, output is allocated by fixed rate regardless of the yield. So even if 
the tenant exerts more effort and as a result increases the output, half of the increment will 
be taken by the landlord. Therefore, it reduces the tenant's effort to improve his output, 
resulting in dominance of low productivity and low rent revenue caused by primitive and 
extensive farming. (Teikoku Nokai, 1942. p. 49.)” 
While the inefficiency in terms of incentives associated with share tenancy is not 
straightforward because the landlord might be able to monitor and enforce the tenant’s effort 
(Cheung 1969) or can mitigate the moral hazard by providing dynamic incentives of refusing 
contract renewal of unsatisfactory tenant (Otsuka 2007), the standard argument indicates the benefit 
of risk-sharing in justifying the adoption of share tenancy. Thus, it is predicted that share tenancies 
should prevail in villages with high risks and adopted among tenants who are more risk averse (for a 
recent study, see Allen (1999), Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), and Chiappori and Salanie (2003)).   
Rent reduction can be considered as an alternative and possibly superior means of balancing 
risk-sharing and provision of incentives. Arimoto (2005) shows that a landlord can benefit from 
incorporating a rent reduction into a pure fixed-rent contract if the tenant is risk-averse because it 
reduces the tenant's risk. Moreover, because it is basically a fixed-rent contract, a rent reduction 
contract provides more incentives to a tenant and is therefore more efficient than a share tenancy if 
production risk is not too severe and when a tenant is not too risk-averse. Given that landlords insure 
against risk in bad years by reducing rents, risk-sharing becomes less important when choosing 
between contracts. 
 
3.2. Transaction  costs 
Despite its superiority in terms of incentives and risk-sharing, a rent reduction contract is not 
necessarily better than a share tenancy because of the associated transaction costs
4. According to the 
                                                        
4  Another reason mentioned in the report is that the landlord adopted a share tenancy to obtain straw 
for horse breeding (which was common in the Iwate prefecture: the region enjoyed suitable natural   10
report Special Tenancy Customs (Iwate Prefecture, 1932), the main reason for the adoption of a share 
tenancy was instability in crop output, which increased the transaction costs of levying a fixed rent. 
The main concern was that, because of output fluctuations, it was impossible for a tenant to pay a 
fixed rent every year, and hence the landlord and the tenant were obliged to negotiate rent reductions 
frequently. The same reason is reported in the Taisho 10 Survey of Tenancy Custom (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce 1926) as well (p. 192). At the same time, the survey reports a special 
tenancy custom of fixed rent tenancy in the narrow sense. This was the fixed rent contract without 
rent reduction. According to the Survey, this contractual form was observed in those areas where 
disasters were frequent and therefore negotiations for rent reduction were troublesome. It was 
reported that the rent of this contract was lower than that of the ordinary fixed rent contract with rent 
reduction by 10%-20% (ibid, p.209). The difference in the rent can be interpreted to reflect the 
transaction costs. 
In the context of prewar Japan, two transaction costs associated with the implementation of rent 
reduction were observed: costs of inspecting crop yields (inspection costs) and costs of negotiating 
rent reductions (negotiation costs). Note that these transaction costs are of contract enforcement and 
are different from those of previous studies that focused on the costs of enforcement, supervision, 
monitoring, and management of inputs and outputs (see, for example, Cheung (1969), Alston et al 
(1984), Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), Shaban (1987), Allen and Lueck (1995), and Chew (1998)). 
Inspection costs were necessary because rent reduction is granted only when the output  y  
was below the threshold,  y ˆ . To confirm that this condition holds, the landlord and the tenant had to 
inspect the output, which required substantial effort and time in sampling the crop and achieving an 
agreement of the inspection. This could be costly since the landlord has no incentive to reduce the 
rent ex post and tends to overestimate the actual output, whereas the tenants are motivated to 
understate the output to get a greater rent reduction. In practice, determining the “standard” output 
y ---average output over recent years---was essential for implementing rent reduction. This is 
because the threshold level of output  y ˆ   to start granting the rent reduction was based on  y , which 
was typically set at the 70%-80% of  y . However, reaching agreement on  y   was not easy because 
                                                                                                                                                                    
conditions and mountainous topology (Mori, 2003). It was common to share output in sheaves under 
a share tenancy, while under a fixed-rent contract, the tenant paid with threshed rice. The reason for 
this is unclear, because it was possible for the landlord to ask the tenant to provide straw under a 
fixed-rent tenancy. One possibility is that a tenancy arrangement was made solely for rough rice and 
not sheaves, and the landlord needed a special arrangement to request the delivery of straw under a 
fixed-rent tenancy, whereas under a share tenancy incorporating the taba-wake custom, the output 
was shared in sheaves.   11
output tended to vary with the fertility of the plots and the technology used (Teikoku Nokai, 1927, p. 
22). Note that share tenancy does not require precise measure of output and inspection cost was 
unnecessary, since the essence of share tenancy is to share the output; the absolute amount of output 
did not matter as long as the parties can split the output with the agreed ration. In practice, the parties 
to a share contract divided output on the basis of taba-wake---“sharing sheaves”---, which involved 
setting out the harvested sheaves in the paddy, after which each party took its turn in taking every 
other sheaf. By letting a tenant stack up the sheaves in a way what he believes is equal and allowing 
a landlord to choose the sheaves he takes satisfies both parties and leaves no room for conflict. 
Negotiation costs under a rent reduction contract were relevant because, in many cases, tenancy 
contracts were verbal arrangements lacking legal formality. The process of rent reduction was 
dominated by moral codes, social norms and customs. There were initially no explicit agreements 
between landlords and tenants on definitions of production shock or how to measure it. Rent 
reduction rates were also indeterminate. 
We note that, just like a rent reduction contract, share tenancy was not free of transaction costs. 
The cost of attending and monitoring the harvesting, which was necessary every year, was perceived 
to be one of the costs of share tenancy along with tenant’s shirking. Rents for paddies under a share 
tenancy were shared either in standing crops before harvesting (so the landlord had to harvest by 
herself), in sheaves immediately after harvesting, or in grain after threshing and drying; the latter 
was customary. In any case, it was common for the landlord under share tenancy to attend the 
harvesting after agreeing with the tenant on which day to harvest, in order to avoid underreporting of 
output and to make certain of collecting the rent
5. To reduce this cost, absentee landlords and large 
landlords were more likely to adopt rent reduction contracts than resident landlords (MAF, 1934, p. 
402). Rent reduction contracts have the advantage of saving this cost but they incurred inspection 
and negotiation costs that might have outweighed such benefit.   
In summary, while rent reduction contracts can save the attendance cost that is necessary under 
share tenancy every year, it incurred investigation and negotiation costs in bad years. Therefore, a 
rent reduction contract mitigate the trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing but generate a new 
trade-off between incentives and transaction costs. 
These transaction costs, that can potentially inhibit the adoption of rent reduction contracts, 
were in fact relevant and large. Some landlords switched back to share tenancies to avoid frequent 
                                                        
5  Otsuka (2007) also notes the same point.   12
late payment and rent reduction. Requests for rent reductions and determination of the rate of 
reduction were two of the main causes of the tenancy disputes that arose in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Disputes arose over where and how to sample the harvest. For example, in Gunma prefecture, in 
1927, a dispute arose when tenants requested a rent reduction by claiming a 15% decrease in the 
yield, while the landlords asserted that the yield was above average (Sato, 1987, p. 54). In 
Yamanashi prefecture, the landlords and the ward mayor, a witness to the sampling, accepted a 
request to resample made by the tenants, who claimed that a primary sampling paddy did not fairly 
evaluate the crop of that year (Sato, 1987, p. 210). After agreeing on the estimation of output, the 
parties then had to negotiate the rent reduction, which was another source of dispute. 
The transaction costs were sometimes reduced by the community or the village, which 
informally governed the individual tenancy arrangements in the village. The quasi-legal–based 
tenancy relationships referred to as the “collective landlord-tenant relationships”' were based on 
either a “cooperative association”' or a “collective tenancy contract” (Sakane, 1990). A cooperative 
association was a village organization with a committee to coordinate tenancy relationships. It 
maintained collective relationships between the landlords and the tenants in the village under the 
yield inspection (kemi) committee and collectively determined the criteria for rent reductions in the 
community (Shoji, 1991)
6. A collective tenancy contract is a formal contract written after the tenancy 
conciliation based on the Tenancy Conciliation Law of 1924. It had clauses on late payment and 
procedure of yield inspection and was agreed upon collectively between the group of landlords and 
tenants in the village. In case of the collective tenancy contract of 1931 in Kawarajiri village in 
Kyoto, the contract prescribed the procedure used for yield sampling when crops were bad: a request 
for yield sampling had to be made at least ten days before the harvest; the first yield sampling had to 
be performed by representatives of the landlords and tenants with agricultural committee staff in 
attendance; and if agreement could not be reached after the first sampling, the parties had to delegate 
the sampling to the agricultural committee staff, whose decision the parties had to accept (Sakane, 
1990). 
                                                        
6  An example is the Showa-kai formed in 1927 in Umaji village of Kyoto Prefecture after the 
tenancy dispute over bad crops in 1926 (Sakane, 1990). The dispute was settled by a rent reduction 
of 23% and an understanding that all future issues between landlords and tenants should be dealt 
with the cooperative association---the Showa-kai. The Showa-kai comprised ten board members: five 
each representing the tenants and the landlords. It was given an exclusive authority to sample and 
inspect output in bad years and to decide the rates of rent reduction. The rent-reduction system 
institutionalized by the Showa-kai was successful in preventing tenancy disputes after that.   13
These cases suggest that the transaction costs associated with rent reductions were reduced by 
the communal governance of tenancy relationships incorporating explicit and transparent institutions 
for rent reduction. The process of rent reduction was executed collectively and objectively and hence, 
arbitrariness and uncertainty was reduced. The main characteristic of prewar Japanese tenancy 
relationships, relative to those of other Asian countries, was that they were embedded in the 
communal society. It was common for communities to intervene in private tenancy relationships 
relating to yield sampling, collection of rents, rice inspections, and rent reductions. These communal 
interventions possibly originated from the Murauke system in the Tokugawa period, the village 
taxation system under which village member households were jointly responsible for paying the land 
tax imposed to a village. Under this joint liability, a village held various social activities including 
the management of irrigation systems and community forests, politics, and ceremonial functions, 
which likely enhanced social capital. 
 
3.3. Determinants  of  tenancy contract choice: the case of Iwate prefecture 
Iwate prefecture, located in northeastern Japan, was one of the few prefectures that had a high 
prevalence of share tenancy (Table 4). The availability of village-level tenancy contract data in 
Iwate prefecture allows us to quantitatively examine the determinants of contract choice. We utilize 
the data on the proportion of the area cultivated under share tenancy as a percentage of the total 
tenanted area (hereafter, the percentage of share tenancy) in February 1930 for 100 of the 236 
villages in Iwate prefecture (reported in Iwate Prefecture (1932)). Missing observations are 
complemented with the percentage of share tenancy at the county level in 1935 reported in Iwate 
Prefecture (1954). Because the contract data reflects the contractual status after the 1929 crop season, 
we match them with other village-level data that represents potential determinants of contract choice, 
mainly constructed from the Annual Statistics of Iwate Prefecture (Iwate Ken Tokei Sho ) for 1929. 
Our empirical specification is the following: 
i i i i i Community Wealth Risk Share ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0 % . 
The dependent variable %Share is the percentage of share tenancy in tenanted paddies in village i in 
1929. Riski is the measure of risk of rice production, Wealthi is the vector of variables that capture 
the average wealth level of tenant farmers that affect their attitude and tolerance toward risk, 
Communityi represents communal ties in village i, and  i ε   is the error term.   14
The indicator of risk of rice production is the village-level coefficient of variation of the rice 
yield over 15 years from 1920 to 1934
7. This represents the risks associated with rice production, 
possibly because of bad weather, floods, droughts, or damage caused by insects and disease. The 
period 1920-1934 covers 10 years (1920-1929) before the year under consideration 1929, and 5 
years after (1930-1934). The latter 5 years is included to capture the disastrous crop failure in 1934. 
This is to take into account that Iwate is periodically attacked by severe crop failures that halve the 
output approximately every 10 years, but the 1920s was exceptionally stable (Figure 2). We wish to 
include at least one severe crop failure and 1934 is the nearest from 1929. 
 
[Figure 2: Rice yield in Iwate prefecture, 1900-50.] 
 
Figure 3 shows a map the geographic distribution of share tenancy, measures of risk, and the 
terrain of Iwate prefecture. One can observe that share tenancy was concentrated in the coastal areas, 
where the rice production was relatively risky compared to inland. One cause of frequent and severe 
crop failures in the coastal areas was the seasonal wind known as Yamase, a cool moist air current 
originating in the Okhotsk Sea that blasts from the Pacific Ocean side of the Tohoku region in early 
summer (Bokura, 1998). A remarkable feature of cool summers in the Tohoku region is that there is a 
stark difference between the damage caused to the Pacific side of the region and that caused to the 
Sea of Japan side. This is because the Yamase is only 1,000 to 1,500 meters above the ocean and the 
wind from the Pacific side is blocked and weakened by the Ohu Mountains before reaching the Sea 
of Japan side. In the Iwate prefecture, the wind is blocked by the Kitakami Highlands. This 
topographical condition leads to substantial rice yield variability in the areas along the Pacific 
Ocean. 
 
[Figure 3: Distribution of tenancy contracts, terrain, and risk in Iwate] 
 
                                                        
7  Rice yield could be endogenous to contract choice. We construct our risk variables based on rice 
yield because, to our knowledge, there is no theoretical reasoning to believe that the choice of 
contract affects yield variability but mean. However, it might be reasonable to imagine that tenants 
cultivating under rent reduction contracts may try to reduce yield variability compared to those 
cultivating under share tenancy, because the former burden involves more risk. In this case, risk 
measured by rice yield under rent reduction contract would be smaller and therefore the coefficient 
will be overestimated. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the farmers were able to control risk given the 
technology of the period of our study.   15
Table 5 reports the village-level cross-section two-limit Tobit estimates of the determinants of 
tenancy contract choice. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable 
is positively correlated with the percentage of share tenancy in tenanted paddies. In any specification, 
all of the risk variables have positive and highly statistically significant coefficients, implying that 
share tenancy was likely to be adopted in the villages with greater risk.   
 
[Table 5: Tobit estimates of tenancy contract choice in Iwate prefecture, 1929] 
 
In column (2), we include variables that proxy the tenant’s wealth and income, since wealthier 
tenants may able to accept a rent reduction contract that is riskier than share tenancy. The variables 
used are the average landholdings (paddies and fields) per farm household and gross average total 
output per household (including non-farm households)
8. The proportion of tenant farmers is included 
to control for the fact that tenant’s landholdings are typically smaller than that of the 
owner-cultivators. The results indicate that relatively wealthy villages tended to adopt a rent 
reduction contract rather than a share tenancy, but the estimates are not significant in several 
specifications.  
In column (3), two variables of village-wide risk-coping institutions---dummy variables 
indicating the existence of at least one credit cooperative and a rice bank in each village in 1929
9--- 
are included since these would enable the tenants to adopt riskier contracts. Only one of the 
coefficients for the risk-coping institutions is significant and have the expected negative sign. 
Column (4) includes community variables to see whether community ties affected contract 
choice. However, since direct data on the distribution of cooperative associations or collective 
tenancy contracts are not available, we use several indirect proxies that would arguably represent 
communal ties. The paddy-to-field ratio is intended to capture communal ties since paddies require 
collective action to operate and manage irrigation and commons (Tamaki, 1983:19-20). The sign is 
                                                        
8  These variables were computed by dividing the total landholdings, or gross total output, 
aggregated at the village-level by the number of resident households in the village. 
9  The credit cooperative variable is based on the complete list of industrial cooperatives in Japan in 
1924 (Sangyo kumiai chuo kai, 1925). The rice bank variable comes from the individual rice bank 
(goso) data collected around 1936 by the Sekisetsu chiho noson keizai chosa sho (Research Institute 
of Rural Economy in Snowy Region) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The results of this 
survey are summarized in the report Tohoku chiho ni okeru biko goso ni kansuru chosa (Survey of 
the precautionary rice banks in Tohoku region) in 1936. Rice banks established after 1929 are 
excluded, most of which were established following the famine of 1934 by the relief fund provided 
by the Emperor and the government.   16
consistent with our transaction cost story. But alternatively, we can also interpret it as a wealth effect 
since paddies are generally more productive than fields. The proportion of households engaged in 
agriculture represents occupational homogeneity, dependence on agriculture, and also reflects the 
idea that communal ties are generally stronger in agriculture-oriented villages due to the need for 
collective action over the use and management of irrigation and common land. All of the coefficients 
are positive and insignificant. 
We also construct variables that represent collective action in the village in 1960. These 
variables indicate the ratio of relevant agricultural communities to total agricultural communities 
within the village that conducted voluntary collective activities on pest control, shipping of 
agricultural products, and community ownership of agricultural machines
10. We find that collective 
actions of pest control and shipping in 1960 are correlated with the adoption of rent reduction 
contracts in 1930. Again, several interpretations are possible. Primarily, if the intensity of voluntary 
collective action in 1960 reflects strong communal ties in the 1920s, we may interpret this to mean 
communities were able to lower transaction costs through communal governance of 
landlord-tenancy relationships. However, the actual causality may be the reverse; villages might 
have been able to conduct collective actions in 1960 because they built up social capital by 
governing the process of rent reduction in prewar period. Another possible interpretation could be 
that such communities might also have been effective in mitigating moderate risk and encouraged 
the adoption of rent reduction contracts through informal mutual insurance.   
For interpretation of the magnitudes of coefficients, marginal effects of changes of independent 
variables given the censoring of dependent variable is reported in column (5). OLS estimates are also 
presented in column (6) for comparison. A one standard deviation increase in the coefficient of 
variation of rice yield raises the percentage of share tenancy for 10.6% (derived from 1.315×8.06), 
whereas a 1% increase in the proportion of agricultural communities within a villages that conduct 
pest control or shipping collectively in 1960 is associated with a 22.2% and 11.9% lower percentage 
of share tenancy, respectively. 
In sum, the estimation results suggest that contract choice in prewar Iwate prefecture was 
affected by risk; share tenancy contracts were more likely to be adopted in the villages with highly 
fluctuating yields and severe damage in years of serious crop failure. Also, the positive correlation 
between our community tie variables and adoption of rent reduction contract is consistent with the 
                                                        
10  This data is derived from the Agricultural Community Survey conducted as part of Census of 
Agriculture and Forestry every 10 years.   17
idea that strong community ties ease the adoption of rent reduction contracts, either by reducing the 
transaction costs of rent reduction or by mitigating risk through mutual insurance. However, the 
result should be interpreted with caution since there are several alternative possible interpretations 
which we cannot completely identify due to data limitations. 
 
4.  Contract choice and productivity 
What is the historical implication of agrarian tenancy in Japanese economic development? 
Theory predicts that if monitoring and enforcement of tenant’s effort or provision of dynamic 
incentives is not possible, the land productivity diminishes in the order of owner-cultivation and pure 
fixed-rent contract, rent reduction contract, and share tenancy because the marginal profit of the 
tenants becomes smaller (Arimoto, 2005). Thus, the prevalence of rent reduction contracts might 
have prevented the fall in productivity despite the widespread tenancy relationships. 
 
4.1. Previous  results 
In studies reported to date, no difference in land productivity between owner-cultivation and 
tenancy in Japan has been found. By comparing rice yield per unit plot of paddy and rice yield per 
working hour reported in several agricultural household surveys, Kajii (1986) concluded that paddies 
under owner-cultivation were more productive than those under tenancy around 1900 but the 
difference became less clear thereafter. Owner-cultivation was no more productive than tenancy in 
the 1930s, once the farming area is controlled for. Kawagoe (1995) reached the same conclusion 
using different household surveys. The differences in productivity seem to be come from differences 
in the cultivation area where farmers with larger farms tended to be more productive. Moreover, 
Kawagoe confirms no productivity difference at the prefectural level by comparing the growth rate 
of rice yield before and after the drastic land reform implemented after World War II. The land 
reform transformed the majority of the tenanted land to owner-cultivation, so prefectures with a high 
tenancy rate before the reform should have higher productivity growth if there were any productivity 
difference between owner-cultivation and tenancy. He finds negative but insignificant correlation 
between tenancy rate before the land reform and productivity growth, implying that the reform had 
no impact on productivity and that productivities were similar regardless of the prevalence of 
tenancy. To summarize, no productivity difference is found either at the household level or the 
prefecture level. However, they do not take into account the choice of contracts. Since the majority   18
of the contracts were rent reduction contracts in prewar Japan and that this contract provides fairly 
good incentives to the tenant, it is not so surprising to see no productivity difference between 
owner-cultivation and tenancy. 
On the other hand, the descriptive evidences of low productivity under share tenancy compared 
to “ordinary” tenancy (i.e., rent reduction contract) are mixed. The report Share Tenancy in Japan 
(MAF, 1934) indicates that, while there were regions where share tenancy was equally productive as 
that under rent reduction contract, the land productivity under share tenancy was only 2/3 to 1/2 in 
many cases. This Marshallian inefficiency is identified as “the cost of share tenancy” in other official 
documents of the time as well (MAF, 1926, 1934; Iwate Prefecture, 1932). Thus, Marshallian 
inefficiency was widely recognized by the contemporary government officials. However, the 
causality of inefficiency is not so clear. The report suggests two reasons: the paddies rented out for 
share tenancy were less fertile to begin with (so the causality is reversed in this case), and the tenants 
take charge of cultivating their own paddies, applying less fertilizer and weeding than the paddies 
under share tenancy (a typical Marshallian inefficiency) (MAF, 1934, p. 375). 
 
4.2. Prefecture-level  fixed-effect analysis on productivity 
To investigate the effect of contract choice on productivity, we conducted prefecture-level 
fixed-effect estimations, regressing rice yield on percentage of area of tenanted paddies to all paddies 
and its interaction term with the measures of the extent of share tenancy. If the rice yields in share 
tenanted paddies were lower than those under rent reduction contracts, then prefectures with a higher 
proportion of share tenancy within tenanted paddies would see the mean rice yield decline as the 
percentage of tenanted paddies increased. The dataset is constructed from Kayo (1983) and consists 
of all 47 prefectures in Japan for 20 years from 1915 to 1934 resulting in a total of 940 observations. 
Rice yield per unit plot of paddy in a prefecture can be written as 
T T O O y p y p y + = , where 
T O p p ,   is the percentage of area of paddy under owner-cultivation and tenancy, respectively, and 
T O y y ,   is the corresponding yield. Since 





it it share p p y ε δ δ β β β + + + + + = * 2 1 0 , 
where  it y  represents rice yield in prefecture  i  in year t  and  i δ  ,  t δ  are prefecture and year 
fixed effects. Given prefecture fixed effects,  1 β   mearsures the effect of a 1% increase in the share   19
of area under tenancy on overall rice yield. The term  share p
T
it *   represents the interaction of the 
percentage of tenanted paddies and the prevalence of share tenancy within tenanted paddies. Since 
the measure of prevalence of share tenancy is only available for one period in 1941, we are forced to 
assume that this has not changed throughout the period of consideration until 1941.   
Table 6 presents the results of prefectural-level fixed-effect estimates of rice yield per unit plot 
of paddy. Prefecture fixed-effects and year dummies are included in all specifications. Column (1) 
shows that rice productivity is lower when a higher percentage of paddies was cultivated under 
tenancy, suggesting the realization of Marshallian inefficiency. Column (2) uses the percentage of 
tenant farmers (separated into owner-cum-tenant and tenant farmers) to all farmers instead of 
tenanted paddies and gives a similar result. In column (3), we interact the percentage of tenanted 
paddies with a dummy variable of ‘share tenancy prefecture’, which equals 1 if a prefecture had 
more than 5%
11 of paddies cultivated under share tenancy, and 0 otherwise. The magnitude of the 
coefficient of interaction term is twice as large as the coefficient of percentage of tenanted paddies. 
This implies that an increase of tenancy had a greater negative impact on rice yield in prefectures 
with higher prevalence of share tenancy, again suggesting the Marshallian inefficiency.   
 
[Table 6: Tenancy and productivity: Prefecture-level fixed-effect estimates, 1915-1934.] 
 
The result in column (1) indicates that a 1% increase in the percentage of tenanted paddy 
decreases the overall rice yield by 0.012 koku/tan. The mean rice yield is 1.9201 koku/tan so this 
implies a 0.62% decline resulting in 1.9081 koku/tan. Evaluating at the mean, we obtain the 





4793 . 0 5207 . 0 9081 . 1




where 0.5107 and 0.4893 is the share of area of tenanted paddies and owner-cultivated paddies 
respectively, at the mean. Solving this yields 1.3329 koku/tan for tenanted paddies and 2.5329 for 
owner-cultivated paddies, where the ratio of the former to the latter is 0.5262, i.e. productivity of the 
tenanted paddies were only half of the owner-cultivated paddies. This seems to be too small and it is 
                                                        
11  Five percent criterion is chosen to include enough prefectures as ‘share tenancy prefectures’. See 
Table 4.   20
likely to be skewed by observations in extremely bad years. In columns (4) and (5), we drop 19 
observations of extremely bad years when the rice yield was less than 70% of the mean 
intertemporal rice yield of a given prefecture. The coefficient of the percentage of tenanted paddy is 
now -0.005 in column (4), which is equivalent to a 0.26% decrease, evaluating at the mean. The 
calculated rice yield for tenanted paddies is 1.6755 koku/tan and 2.1755 koku/tan for 
owner-cultivated paddies, where the ratio is 0.7702; tenanted paddies are 23% less productive than 
those under owner cultivation. The coefficient of the interaction of percentage of tenanted paddies 
and the dummy variable ‘share tenancy prefecture’ in column (5) is smaller than that of the 
percentage of tenanted paddies but is insignificant. This is because 9 out of the 19 observations 
dropped were those of ‘share tenancy prefecture’. 
These results indicate that the productivity of tenanted paddies was lower than owner-cultivated 
paddies and suggests the presence of Marshallian inefficiency in prewar Japan at the prefecture level. 
Moreover, some evidence suggests that productivity loss due to tenancy was likely to be larger in 
prefectures with a greater proportion of share tenancy. Taking these together, we conclude that, while 
landlords in prewar Japan were not able to resolve the productive inefficiency of tenancy completely, 
they were at least able to mitigate such a loss by providing more incentives to the tenants with the 
adoption of a rent reduction contract. 
Why is our result different to the previous studies? There are two major differences between our 
analysis and the prefecture-level investigation by Kawagoe (1995). First, we limited our analysis to 
the prewar period (1915-1934) while Kawagoe (1995) used a longer period from 1923 and 1959 
(averaged over 5 years centering on 1923 and 1959). Second, we used annual data, whereas 
Kawagoe used only two time points. Since we used a shorter interval and looked at the period before 
World War II, our results are less likely to be biased by omitted variables that affect productivity 
growth other than the potential inefficiency caused by tenancy. In particular, several policies enacted 
after World War II seem to have enhanced productivity. The government procurement food price was 
raised after 1952 to stimulate food production. Public investment in land increased after the 
establishment of the Land Improvement Act in 1949 also fostered productivity growth.   
 
5. Concluding  comments 
Agricultural productivity growth is essential to avoid leaping into the Malthusian trap and to 
stimulate modern economic growth. In the earlier stage of Japan’s economic development, the   21
prevalence of the rent reduction contract seems to have sustained agricultural productivity despite 
the prevalence of landlord-tenancy relations by providing incentives and mitigating risk from the 
tenant better than other types of contracts. However, historical evidence suggests that rent reduction 
contracts incurred transaction costs on inspecting the output and negotiating the size of the rent 
reduction, which could be the main reason for its unpopularity outside Japan. Our quantitative 
evidence at the village-level suggests that share tenancy was more likely to be adopted in villages 
with higher risk, supporting the standard theory of risk-sharing and incentives in the choice of 
tenancy contracts. Moreover, rent reduction contracts were more likely to be found in villages with 
stronger communal ties. This result, along with the historical anecdotal evidence, suggests that 
transaction costs and the presence of informal community institutions that mediate and enforce the 
rent reductions could have been one of the critical determinants of contract choice. 
In consideration for contract choice and productivity, a negative correlation between the 
prevalence of tenancy and productivity is found at the prefectural level and such inefficiency was 
likely to be worse in prefectures with a greater proportion of share tenancy. Therefore, the result 
suggests at the macro-level that Marshallian inefficiencies were common in prewar Japan, but that it 
was at least partly mitigated by the adoption of rent reduction contracts.   
In short, the agriculture in prewar Japan may have benefitted from the prevalence of rent 
reduction contracts that prevented the dramatic decline of productivity due to widespread tenancy. 
Such a unique contract was probably sustained by the informal communal institutions that mitigated 
the transaction costs of rent reduction. Therefore, the experience of prewar Japan suggests the 
importance of informal institutions on agricultural development and industrialization through the 
enforcement of complex contracts. However, further quantitative studies are required to reach a 
concrete and confident conclusion on the relationship between tenancy contract and productivity.   22
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Figure 1: Distribution of output in tenancy relations 
Source: Umemura et al (1966); Bureau of Food, Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce of Japan 
(1922); Bureau of Food Administration of Japan(1948); Bureau of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce of Japan, Kokumotsu Yoran (Handbook of Grain), various issues. 
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Figure 2: Rice yield in Iwate prefecture, 1900-50.   
Source: Kayo (1987).   28
(a) % of share tenancy (1930) (ｂ) c.v. of rice yield (1922-31)
(c) paddy-field ratio (1929) (d) terrain  
Figure 3: Distribution of tenancy contracts, terrain, and risk in Iwate 
 
 




Table 1: Growth of agricultural production and productivity 
Period Agri-  Input  Labor    TFP 
 cultural  Labor  Arable  Capital Total  productivity   
 output    land  stock  input    
1880-1900 1.6  0.0 0.5 0.9 0.4 1.6  1.2
1900-1920 2.0  -0.6 0.7 1.3 0.5 2.6  1.5
1920-1935 0.9  -0.2 0.1 0.9 0.5 1.1  0.4
Note: Annual rate of change (%). 
Source: Hayami (1973), pp.32-41. 
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Table 2: Extent of tenancy relations 
 










Total owned  tenanted
  (1,000 households)      (1,000 ha)   
1908 5,408 1,800 2,117 1,492   5,504 3,005 2,499
1913 5,444 1,745 2,178 1,521   5,794 3,159 2,635
1918 5,477 1,697 2,229 1,550   6,027 3,250 2,777
1923 5,440 1,665 2,240 1,536   6,039 3,231 2,808
1928 5,576 1,748 2,345 1,483   6,035 3,270 2,765
1933 5,622 1,746 2,376 1,500   5,979 3,159 2,819
1938 5,520 1,696 2,361 1,462   6,028 3,221 2,806
 (Percentage)             
1908  100.0 33.3 39.1 27.6   100.0 54.6 45.4 
1913  100.0 31.7 40.4 27.9   100.0 54.5 45.5 
1918  100.0 31.0 40.7 28.3   100.0 53.9 46.1 
1923  100.0 30.6 41.2 28.2   100.0 53.5 46.5 
1928  100.0 31.3 42.1 26.6   100.0 54.2 45.8 
1933  100.0 31.1 42.3 26.7   100.0 52.8 47.1 
1938  100.0 30.7 42.8 26.5    100.0 53.4 46.5 
Source: Toyo Keizai Shinposha (1927), p.507; Toyo Keizai Shinposha (1991), p.167, p.173. 
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Table 3: Distribution of household by size of land ownership 
  Total  -0.5 ha  0.5-1 ha 1-3 ha 3-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-50 ha    50 ha-
 (1,000  households)           
1908 4,937 2,278  1,288 926 279 123 40  2.6 
1913 4,899 2,355  1,231 882 264 123 40  3.0 
1918 4,863 2,376  1,172 890 254 123 44  3.6 
1923 4,879 2,416  1,181 883 228 118 49  5.1 
1928 5,045 2,504  1,240 910 229 113 45  4.1 
1933 5,120 2,550  1,284 900 223 113 46  3.6 
1938 5,089 2,475  1,308 928 222 110 44  3.2 
  (Percentage)          
1908  100.0 46.1  26.1 18.8  5.7  2.5  0.8 0.05 
1913  100.0 48.1  25.1 18.0  5.4  2.5  0.8 0.06 
1918  100.0 48.9  24.1 18.3  5.2  2.5  0.9 0.07 
1923  100.0 49.5  24.2 18.1  4.7  2.4  1.0 0.10 
1928  100.0 49.6  24.6 18.0  4.5  2.2  0.9 0.08 
1933  100.0 49.8  25.1 17.6  4.4  2.2  0.9 0.07 
1938  100.0 48.6  25.7 18.2  4.4  2.2  0.9 0.06 
Source: Toyo Keizai Shinposha (1927), p.507; Toyo Keizai Shinposha (1991), p.167, p.173. 
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Table 4: Rice productivity and areas of share tenancy by prefecture (1941) 
   rice     area  under    area under 
 productivity    tenancy  share  tenancy 
 1931-40    1941  1941 
 (koku/tan)    (cho) (cho)  (%) 
prefecture Mean  S.D.  C.V.     paddy  field    paddy field paddy field 
Hokkaido  1.345  0.44  32.58   115,227 302,040 150   0.1%  
Aomori 1.68  0.4  23.93    44,044 19,804 5,379 3,155  12.2%  15.9%
Iwate 1.87  0.32  17.01    28,018 17,731 3,750 10,350  13.4%  58.4%
Miyagi 1.945  0.27  14.1    67,294 17,808 1,250 20  1.9%  0.1%
Akita 1.895  0.21  11.03    69,707 8,406 4,000 20  5.7%  0.2%
Yamagata  2.17  0.26  11.88    62,985 15,760      
Fukushima  1.795  0.28  15.49   51,830 24,625 53   0.1%  
Ibaraki  1.81  0.21  11.6   58,662 67,976 120   0.2%  
Tochigi 1.74  0.19  10.94    41,946 31,192 8 1  0.0%  0.0%
Gunma  2.105  0.34  16.27   19,111 32,656 256   1.3%  
Saitama  1.83  0.24  13.28    40,740 41,673      
Chiba 1.87  0.18  9.52    58,890 43,098 550 200  0.9%  0.5%
Tokyo 1.885  0.22  11.58    5,295 15,132      
Kanagawa  2.05  0.28  13.75   9,777 18,344 3   0.0%  
Niigata  1.96  0.27  13.69    109,069 23,042      
Toyama  2.045  0.2  9.58    49,183 2,616      
Ishikawa  2.135  0.18  8.5    26,379 4,216      
Fukui  2.075  0.16  7.64   23,681 2,687 15   0.1%  
Yamanashi  2.315  0.26  11.41   10,722 14,492 200   1.9%  
Nagano 2.14  0.23  10.55    36,484 31,047 2,300 700  6.3%  2.3%
Gifu  2.04  0.22  10.83   33,417 9,832 4,670   14.0%  
Shizuoka 2.07  0.25  11.84    32,000 26,239 5 10  0.0%  0.0%
Aichi 2.08  0.27  12.92    46,354 18,990 100 5  0.2%  0.0%
Mie  1.925  0.23  12.02   30,252 8,160 12   0.0%  
Shiga  2.305  0.16  6.82    31,575 2,537      
Kyoto  2.025  0.3  14.93    19,070 3,463      
Osaka  2.42  0.22  8.95    24,194 3,758      
Hyogo  2.16  0.18  8.14    51,211 5,120      
Nara  2.42  0.23  9.63    15,258 2,432        33
Wakayama  2.075  0.24  11.37    14,093 4,144      
Tottori 2.095  0.2  9.61    19,593 6,551      
Shimane  1.865  0.16  8.75   28,835 6,516 190   0.7%  
Okayama 2.04  0.21  10.23    42,608 8,683 400 50  0.9%  0.6%
Hiroshima  1.795  0.17  9.65   30,887 7,280 7   0.0%  
Yamaguchi  1.845  0.18  9.71    31,984 4,215      
Tokushima 1.89  0.22  11.76    13,750 5,619 32 15  0.2%  0.3%
Kagawa  2.275  0.3  13.06    25,241 5,378      
Ehime 2.09  0.21  10.05    25,821 12,659 95 20  0.4%  0.2%
Kochi 1.68  0.19  11.03    15,692 7,158 300 2,500  1.9%  34.9%
Fukuoka  2.145  0.17  8.07    53,048 8,909      
Saga 2.365  0.23  9.53    26,988 4,005 363 163  1.3%  4.1%
Nagasaki 1.685  0.24  14.19   15,506 12,046 60 50  0.4%  0.4%
Kumamoto 2.095  0.2  9.61    47,577 25,192 200 60  0.4%  0.2%
Oita  2.02  0.26  13.11   27,777 8,335 150   0.5%  
Miyazaki 1.81  0.17  9.12    23,137 15,768 416 602  1.8%  3.8%
Kagoshima 1.695  0.14  8.23    30,243 39,067 915 2,576  3.0%  6.6%
Okinawa 1.15  0.3  25.78    1,224 7,089 600 300  49.0%  4.2%
All Japan                 1,686,379 1,003,490   26,549 20,797 1.6% 2.1%
Source: “Rice productivity (1931-40)” and “area under tenancy”: Kayo (1983); other data: Sakane 
(2005), Table 1-1, 1-2, 1-6. 
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Table 5: Tobit estimates of tenancy contract choice in Iwate prefecture, 1929 
dependent variable: percentage of share tenancies in tenanted paddies (in area)    
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  dy/dx  OLS 
c.v. of rice yield  4.646  4.268  4.159  2.900   1.315  1.944 
  (0.461)***  (0.464)*** (0.462)*** (0.471)***   (0.358)*** 
landholdings per household   ‐ 16.189 ‐ 16.133 ‐ 4.065   ‐ 1.844 ‐ 0.919 
   (6.749)**  (6.708)**  (6.543)   (5.606) 
total output per household   ‐ 0.004 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.012 ‐ 0.005   ‐ 0.007 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)   (0.006) 
% tenant farmers   ‐ 25.985 ‐ 24.797 ‐ 9.534 ‐ 4.324 ‐ 10.336 
   (18.255)  (18.094)  (17.416)   (13.957) 
credit association     ‐ 7.105 ‐ 4.440 ‐ 2.016 ‐ 4.227 
     (6.100)  (5.699)   (4.565) 
rice bank     ‐ 17.262 ‐ 2.177 ‐ 0.984   ‐ 5.178 
     (13.324)  (12.659)   (7.692) 
paddy‐field ratio     ‐ 13.764 ‐ 6.243 ‐ 12.276 
       (3.414)***   (2.588)*** 
% farming household       3.776  1.712 ‐ 0.534 
       (16.863)   (12.916) 
pestcontrol (%), 1960      ‐ 49.024   ‐ 22.235 ‐ 33.900 
       (11.857)***   (10.026)***
shipping (%), 1960      ‐ 26.216 ‐ 11.890 ‐ 21.656 
       (15.349)*   (10.592)** 
machine (%), 1960      ‐ 8.554   ‐ 3.880 ‐ 1.890 
       (9.925)   (7.479) 
Constant ‐ 81.522 ‐ 30.758 ‐ 23.185  60.677   59.817 
  (12.125)*** (20.519)  (20.725)  (26.251)**   (22.542)***
Observations  224  224  224  209  209  209 
log likelihood ‐ 894.39 ‐ 888.90 ‐ 887.22 ‐ 801.01         
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Tenancy and productivity: Prefecture-level fixed-effect estimates, 1915-1934. 
 
dependent variable: rice yield (koku/cho)        
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





% paddy tenanted ‐ 0.012   ‐ 0.010 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.004 
  (0.003)***   (0.003)*** (0.002)**  (0.002)* 
% paddy tenanted * dummy share     ‐ 0.021   ‐ 0.006 
     (0.008)**   (0.008) 
% owner‐cum‐tenant farmer   ‐ 0.008      
   (0.006)      
% tenant farmer   ‐ 0.017      
   (0.005)***    
Constant  2.449  2.664  2.463  2.123  2.130 
  (0.133)*** (0.326)*** (0.133)*** (0.117)***  (0.117)***
Observations  940  939  940  921  921 
Number of group(pref)  47  47  47  47  47 
R‐squared  0.45  0.44  0.45  0.49  0.49 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: "dummy share" is a dummy variable which takes 1 if a prefecture’s percentage of share 
tenancy in paddy was more than 5% in 1941. Prefectures with dummy share=1 are Aomori, Iwate, 
Akita, Nagano, Gifu, and Okinawa. 
 